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When it comes to considering the repercussions of 
international cycles and crises on an economy, one type 
of approach uses models, empirical regularities and 
synchronization of international business cycles between 
countries as its basis (e.g., Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2009; 
Backus, Kehoe and Kidland, 1992), while another type 
estimates the effects of external crises, volatility or shocks 
on economic growth or performance (e.g., Edwards, 
2007; Aghion and Banerjee, 2005; De Gregorio and 
Lee, 2003; Loayza and Hnatkovska, 2003). In this latter 
tradition, the author (Tello, 2009b) estimated the impact 
of external shocks and preferential trade agreements 
(ptas)1 on real per capita gross domestic product (gdp) 
growth in the Peruvian economy over the period from 
1950 to 2007.
The study concluded that external shocks did not 
alter Peru’s long-run economic growth during that 
period, although they did affect per capita gdp and its 
annual rate of change in the short term. The strength and 
duration of these impacts depended on the handling of 
stabilization policies (or programmes) and on the size 
of the external shocks. Again, the ptas implemented 
 This paper was prepared within the Trade and Poverty in Latin 
America (copla) project framework, with financing from the United 
Kingdom Department for International Development (dfid) through 
the Overseas Development Institute (odi). The author is grateful to 
Gabriel Rodríguez for his collaboration on a copla report on which 
the present study is based. He is also grateful for the support of Hans 
Lavilla, Carmen Zeña and Jairo Flores and for the comments of the 
anonymous cepal Review referee.
1  A preferential trade agreement is defined as a set of instruments that 
countries use for the purpose of reducing or removing restrictions on 
commerce in traded goods, services and factors. These agreements 
can be of four kinds: (i) unilateral, where an economy unilaterally 
reduces its trade restrictions; (ii) bilateral or regional, where two or 
more countries agree to reduce trade restrictions discriminately (as 
countries that are not members of the agreement are excluded from 
its benefits) and reciprocally; (iii) generalized system of preferences, 
where a country agrees to reduce its trade restrictions discriminately for 
a group of countries, without requiring the reductions to be matched by 
them; and (iv) multilateral agreement, this being a regional agreement 
covering a large number of countries, such as the member countries 
of the World Trade Organization (wto).
since the 1970s have not contributed to higher rates of 
productivity and per capita output growth. The effects 
of these agreements have generally been limited by the 
type of development models implemented and by the 
complete failure to reduce non-tariff trade barriers. These 
trade restrictions have continued to limit access to the 
export markets of the country’s main trading partners, 
even though tariff barriers have progressively come down 
as a result of these agreements, which are variously 
unilateral, bilateral or regional, and multilateral in nature.
The present study is an exploratory one, and it 
addresses the subject of external crises. Following 
the first approach, it analyses the effects of (trade and 
financial) integration, sectoral specialization levels 
and ptas on the degree of synchronization between the 
gdp cycles of Peru’s main trading partners and Peru’s 
own gdp. This approach is thus used to evaluate the 
effect in terms of the correlation of partner countries’ 
gdp cycles deriving from a greater or lesser flow of 
goods and capital or from the degree of differentiation 
between these countries’ sectoral structures. The main 
conclusion from the body of evidence reported for the 
1982-2006 period is that the international cycles arising 
because of internal shocks in leading trade partners have 
affected Peru’s real gdp cycles. In contrast, a second 
important conclusion from the estimations is that the 
ptas implemented by Peru during the period considered 
have not had a statistically significant influence on the 
degree of synchronization between Peru’s gdp cycles 
and those of its main trading partners.
This study consists of five sections. Section II 
summarizes the theoretical aspects supporting the 
interrelationship between the degree of synchronization 
of gdp cycles, trade and financial integration, and the 
degree of sectoral specialization between the trading 
countries. Section III describes the specification to be 
estimated and lists the variables to be considered and the 
information sources used. Section IV summarizes the 
findings in the form of a hypothesis, given the exploratory 
nature of the study. Section V sets out the conclusions. 
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Intuitively, the more closely countries are integrated, 
the more strongly business cycles will be transmitted 
between them. Integration may occur through trade 
in goods and services or through flows of capital and 
financial assets. However, this intuitive argument is not 
theoretically sound. Furthermore, there is a striking 
discrepancy between the empirical evidence for the 
degree of output “synchronization” or “co-movement”2 
between countries and the theoretical models that seek 
to explain this degree of synchronization or movement.
Calderón, Chong and Stein (2007), based on 
Stockman (1988), summarize some of the theoretical 
arguments3 using the components of the correlation 
coefficient for the real gdp of two countries, Yi and Yj.
 




























where ρij is the correlation coefficient for the gdp cycles 
of countries i and j, and Ns is the number of sectors.
The first addend of (1.1) reflects the contribution 
made to the correlation coefficient or degree of cycle 
synchronization between two countries by the impact of 
specific shocks (assumed to be equal for both countries) 
in industry or sector k. These “random” shocks are 
independent of other sectors and of time; σk is the 
variance of shocks that are the same for all industries k; 
2 This is measured by Pearson’s coefficient of correlation between 
the gdp of two countries or a group of countries.
3 Other summaries of the theoretical models for the relationship 
between synchronization of international cycles and trade and financial 
integration can be found in Ambler, Cardia and Zimmermann (2002); 
Canova and Dellas (1993); Baxter (1995); Kollman (2001); Kose and 
Yi (2002 and 2001).
σi and σj are the variances of each country’s gdp; and 
wki and wkj are the share of sector k in each country’s 
total gdp. The second addend reflects the contribution 
made to the degree of cycle synchronization in two 
countries by aggregate and country-specific shocks. 
σij is the covariance of these shocks between the two 
countries, and σij.(σi.σj)-1/2 is the correlation resulting 
from the two countries’ shocks.
Standard comparative advantage theory predicts 
that the more highly the countries possessing such an 
advantage are integrated, the more they will specialize, 
and trade will be essentially intersectoral (i.e., goods and 
services from different industries will be exchanged). 
Thus, changes in wki are expected to correlate negatively 
with changes in wkj; also negative, accordingly, will be 
the contribution to the degree of synchronization of the 
first component resulting from industry-specific shocks. 
This implies that the higher the level of integration owing 
to inter-industry trade, the less synchronized the two 
economies’ gdp cycles will be.
Conversely, if trade is dominated by competitive 
advantages, and thus by intra-industry commerce, greater 
integration will mean a higher degree of association 
between sectoral shares and thus greater synchronization 
of the two countries’ gdp cycles.4 In this case, the 
correlation of shocks between the countries would 
reinforce the effects of sector-specific shocks. These 
opposing signs between the degree of synchronization and 
that of integration depend on whether the latter induces 
a higher or lower degree of intersectoral specialization.5
Insofar as financial integration also has consequences 
for sectoral specialization, this too will affect the degree 
of synchronization. Thus, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen 
4  Krugman (1993) and Kose and Yi (2001), among many others, have 
developed this line of theory.
5 Specialization in sectors is consistent with both intra- and inter-
industry trade. In the first case, it involves a more refined kind of 
specialization, such as vertical specialization (Kose and Yi, 2001) 
within the same industry.
II
Synchronization of cycles and relationship 
to the degree of integration in trade, finance 
and sectoral specialization: conceptual 
considerations
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and Yosha (2001 and 2003) argue that while industrial 
specialization brings a number of benefits to an economy, if 
output is not insured against the risks of this specialization 
then the gdp variance resulting from it will entail losses 
of welfare that may be greater than the benefits. Although 
specific types of insurance (catastrophe insurance with 
futures contracts, for example) may provide a way of 
offsetting these risks, it is by geographically diversifying 
their income sources through the international capital 
market that countries and regions insure themselves 
against the risk of specialization. Consequently, if 
interregional and international capital is well integrated, 
countries and regions can insure against industry/sector 
shocks and thereby position themselves to better exploit 
the comparative or competitive advantages they possess.
As in the case of goods and services trade integration, 
the greater the degree of financial integration, the lower 
the degree of synchronization will be if the trade between 
countries is inter-industrial, and the higher it will be when 
trade is intra-industrial. The synchronization of cycles 
between countries is said to be “asymmetrical” in the 
first case and “symmetrical” in the second.
The second component contributing to the degree 
of synchronization is the one resulting from country-
specific (and not sector- or industry-specific) shocks. 
The degree of trade and financial integration can also 
affect this component. Thus, demand shocks in one 
country can have spillovers that increase the covariance 
of countries’ gdp. Such increases in demand in country i 
entail greater demand for goods from country j; the higher 
the degree of integration, the greater the demand effect 
thus transmitted to other countries will be. Consequently, 
this second component (when σij > 0) can offset and 
even exceed the effects of the first component if the 
advantages are comparative in nature and reinforce 
them if the advantages are competitive. In these cases, 
increases in trade integration will lead to increases in 
the synchronization of the two economies’ gdp cycles.
Frankel and Rose (1998) add that policy coordination 
between regions heightens the effects of integration on 
the synchronization of international cycles. Coe and 
Helpman (1995) and Lichtenberg and Van Pottelsberghe 
(1998) stress the transmission of productivity shocks 
between countries. Transmission of such shocks 
by technological diffusion, foreign investment flows 
and technology sources is intensified by trade and 
financial integration.
A second group of theoretical and empirical 
arguments regarding the interrelationships between 
integration, sectoral specialization and synchronization 
were made by Backus, Kehoe and Kidland (1993), who 
discovered what is known as the “quantity anomaly”. In a 
world free of market distortions and with free movement 
of factors and access to trade in goods, positive shocks 
that increase returns in a country or a sector of it entail 
factor and asset movements that result in negative gdp 
correlations. Kose and Yi (2006, 2002 and 2001) show 
that models of international cycles cannot replicate 
empirical evidence on the degree of synchronization 
between countries. These models predict that the more 
trade or financial integration there is, the lower the degree 
of gdp synchronization between countries will be.
Because of this discrepancy between the empirical 
evidence and theoretical models, some of the literature 
has concentrated on introducing “factors or conditions” 
into output or markets such that they can account for 
the degree of synchronization between countries. One 
direct channel, mentioned earlier, is the degree of sectoral 
specialization. Thus, the more the structures of countries’ 
production sectors differ, the less their gdp cycles will 
be synchronized. Two indirect channels, also described 
earlier, operate through the effects of trade and financial 
integration on sectoral specialization.
The direct channels of trade and financial integration 
are taken from the standard models of international trade, 
and introduce some changes of factors or conditions 
into output and markets. Thus, for example, Kose and 
Yi (2001) introduce trade within a single industry or 
sector in goods deriving from “stages in the production 
process”, and obtain a higher degree of synchronization 
when “trade intensity” between countries increases. 
Heathcote and Perri (2002a and 2002b), Calvo and 
Mendoza (2000) and Mendoza (2002) show that distortions 
in the international capital market (such as limitations 
on the ability to lend or borrow capital internationally, 
or liquidity constraints affecting investors) can increase 
the degree of gdp synchronization between countries.
There is a fairly plentiful empirical literature dealing 
with the effects of trade and financial integration and 
of the degree of specialization on gdp synchronization 
between countries. Among the most recent studies, 
that of Calderón, Chong and Stein (2007) stands out. 
This uses a sample of 147 countries in the 1960-1999 
period and employs cross-sectional and panel data 
econometric techniques, concluding that: (i) increases 
in integration or the intensity of goods trade induce 
greater synchronization of gdp cycles between countries; 
(ii) the repercussions of trade intensity are greater for 
the sample of developed countries than for the sample 
of developing countries; and (iii) the repercussions 
of trade intensity are more marked for countries with 
similar sectoral structures.
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Second, Imbs (2004) works with quarterly data 
on 24 countries (six developing, including Peru, and 
18 developed) for the 1980-1999 period and with a 
system of four simultaneous equations, and finds as 
follows: (i) specialization patterns have substantial 
effects on economic cycles between countries, which 
are independent of the degree of trade and financial 
integration; (ii) in the presence of a variety of financial 
integration measures, regions with a high level of 
financial integration present greater synchronization 
of gdp cycles despite their sectoral specialization; and 
(iii) if trade is intra-industrial, there are also increases 
in gdp synchronization between countries.
Lastly, García-Herrero and Ruiz (2008), working 
with a sample of 109 countries (88 of them developing) 
for the 1990-2004 period and with a system of four 
simultaneous equations, estimate the incidence of 
trade, financial and specialization integration on the 
synchronization of Spanish gdp cycles with those of the 
country’s trading partners. These authors find that: (i) the 
intensity of trade and the similarity between the sectoral 
structures of Spain and its trading partners positively 
affect gdp cycle synchronization between Spain and its 
trading partners, and (ii) notwithstanding this, financial 
integration negatively affects synchronization. This finding 
is consistent with standard models of international cycles.
To sum up, the theoretical considerations and 
empirical evidence described in this section indicate that 
while the synchronization of an economy’s gdp cycles 
with those of the countries with which that economy trades 
goods, services and financial assets is associated with 
the degree of integration between the countries’ sectoral 
structures in terms of trade, finance and specialization, 
these relationships are not straightforward but have direct 
and indirect components and depend on other factors, 
such as the sources determining trade, distortions in 
goods, services and financial markets, and the existence 
of different stages in the production process.
The purpose of the present study is to empirically 
identify these associations and interrelationships for 
the Peruvian economy in the 1982-2006 period. To do 
this, it will specify a system of simultaneous equations 
similar to that of the two earlier studies (Imbs, 2004; 
García-Herrero and Ruiz, 2008) and add the effects of 
ptas. These agreements contribute to trade integration 
between their member countries and are expected to 
have the same effects on gdp synchronization as on 
trade integration.
III
Specification of the system of equations  
and information sources
1. The model: specification and basic variables
Theoretical considerations (described in the previous 
section) have been formalized and summarized by Imbs 
(2004) and García-Herrero and Ruiz (2008) using the 
following system of equations:
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 j = 1, 31; t = 1982-2006 
where ρjt, Tjt, Sjt and Fjt, termed “basic variables”, are 
the degree of gdp synchronization (as measured by 
the correlation coefficient for gdp cycles), integration 
of trade in goods, financial integration and the degree 
of sectoral specialization, respectively, between Peru 
and its trading partner, country j, in year t; the matrix 
Xi is formed by the control variables for each equation 
i, and εijt is the error of equation i, country j, year t. 
This system captures direct and indirect effects and the 
theoretical interdependences between the degree of gdp 
cycle synchronization, financial and trade integration, 
and sectoral specialization.
Equation (2.1) captures the total effects of these 
last three factors and of the control variables on the 
degree of gdp synchronization. Equations (2.2), (2.3) 
and (2.4) capture the indirect effects of the degrees of 
integration in finance, trade and sectoral specialization 
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and the interdependences between these variables. Thus, 
in equation (2.2), if trade between Peru and country j is 
dominated by inter-industry trade (and there are no shocks 
in the countries), then an increase in specialization will 
generate a higher degree of goods integration and vice 
versa. In equation (2.4), similarly, if trade is dominated 
by inter-industry flows, then a higher degree of goods 
integration will entail greater sectoral specialization. If 
the sign were the opposite, then trade between Peru and 
country j would be dominated by intra-industry flows.
The degrees of financial and trade integration 
may be complementary or substitutive. They will be 
complementary if financial flows or foreign investment 
go to the export sectors where Peru has comparative 
advantages. In this case, the signs of the coefficients 
of the variables Fjt and Tjt in equations (2.2) and (2.3), 
respectively, will be positive. These degrees will be 
substitutes if financial flows and foreign investment 
go to sectors competing with imports. In this case, the 
signs of the coefficients will be negative. The degree 
of financial integration can also affect the degree of 
sectoral specialization, as noted in the previous section. 
Its effect will be positive if financial integration induces 
intra-industry specialization and negative if financial 
integration induces inter-industry specialization.
The Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter was used to 
measure the gdp cycles of Peru and its partner countries.6 
The degree of synchronization, ρjt, is Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient calculated from 1970 to year t between the 
estimated real gdp cycle of partner country j and the 
estimated real gdp cycle of Peru.
Two indicators are used for the degree of trade 
integration:
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6 With the parameter λ=100, which has the role of penalizing the 
variability of the trend component of the gdp variable. Estimates 
were also produced using another two measures of cycles: the gdp 
variation rate and the errors of a quadratic regression for gdp in Peru 
and its partner countries. The results obtained using these indicators 
do not alter the conclusions of the present study. 
where Nt is the number of years from 1970 to year t; Xji 
and Mji are the values of exports from Peru to country 
j and imports by Peru from country j, respectively, in 
year i (≤ t); Yji is the dollar gdp of country j in year i; Yi 
is the dollar gdp of Peru in year i; and Ywi is the dollar 
gdp of the world in year i. The first indicator represents 
the value of goods trade flows relative to the gdp of Peru 
and its partner countries, and the second represents this 
value relative to world gdp.
Where the degrees of financial integration and 
specialization are concerned, two indicators are also 
used for each degree. These are:
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where Iji is the stock of foreign investment from country 
j in Peru in year i, and sk and skj are the real gdp shares 
of sector k in Peru and in country j. The sectors are: 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction and 
services. The numbering Nt starts in 1982 for the two 
investment indicators and in 1970 for all the other 
variables. Sectoral gdp figures were available up to 2006.7
The indicators for the degree of financial integration 
represent the relative size (relative, that is, to the gdp 
of Peru and its trading partners) and the absolute size 
of the stock of foreign investment from Peru’s trading 
partners. At the same time, the two indicators of sectoral 
specialization represent the degree of similarity in sectoral 
structures between Peru and its partner countries. A 
smaller difference in the degree of sectoral specialization 
between Peru and country j implies an Sjt value close to 
zero (0) and a greater difference in this degree implies 
negative values well below zero (0) for Sjt.
7  Indicators for the four basic variables are given in table A1 of the annex.
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2. Preferential trade agreements (ptas)
The variables representing ptas and included as control 
variables in matrix Xi are of three types for bilateral or 
regional agreements and two types for unilateral and 
multilateral generalized system of preferences (gsp) 
agreements. For the first two types of agreements, the 
variables are:
— Aj = discrete variable taking the value one (1) for 
every year considered, always provided Peru and 
country j are members of agreement A, failing 
which it will take the value zero (0). This variable 
is meant to capture the “country” effect on the 
dependent variable without taking the agreement 
into account.
— DAjt = discrete variable taking the value one (1) if 
Peru and country j are members of agreement A 
during period t of the agreement’s implementation, 
failing which it will take the value zero (0). This 
variable is meant to capture the “trade creation” 
effect of agreement A on the dependent variable. In 
theory, this effect ought to be similar to the effect 
of the degree of trade integration.
— TAjt = variable taking the value of the time variable 
(numbering from 1 to 25 representing the years from 
1982 to 2006) in the period of implementation of 
Peru’s agreement A and zero (0) in other periods. 
This variable is meant to capture the permanent 
effect of the agreement on the trend of the dependent 
variable.
The variables for the other three types of 
agreement are:
— At = binary variables taking the value one (1) in the 
implementation period of the unilateral/multilateral 
agreement or gsp agreement granted to Peru and 
zero (0) in other periods. This variable is meant to 
capture the temporary effect of the agreement on 
the level of the dependent variable.
— TAjt = variable taking the value of the time variable 
(numbers 1 to T representing the years from 1982 
to 2007) in the period of implementation of Peru’s 
agreement A and zero (0) in other periods. This 
variable is meant to capture the permanent effect 
of the agreement on the trend of the dependent 
variable.
The names of the agreements A considered are:8
— ac, Andean Community, initiated in 1970 and in 
force since 1971. Peru withdrew temporarily in 
8  A detailed listing of characteristics of the preferential agreements 
considered can be found in Tello (2009a).
1993 before rejoining in 1997. In accordance with 
the notation for trade agreements, the variables 
 corresponding to this agreement are ac, dac and tac.
— acar, partial scope economic complementation 
agreement (eca) between the ac (excluding the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia) and Argentina; in 
force since 2001. The variables corresponding to 
this agreement are acar and dacar.
— acbr (eca 39), partial scope economic 
complementation agreement between the ac and 
Brazil in 1999. The variables corresponding to this 
agreement are acbr, dacbr, tacbr. 
— eca 38, the Chile-Peru Economic Complementation 
Agreement, in force since 1998. The variables 
corresponding to this agreement are chi, dchi, 
and tchi
— atpdea, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug 
Eradication Act, which is a generalized system 
of preferences granted by the United States to the 
member countries of the ac. These preferences 
were initiated in the Andean Trade Preference Act 
(atpa), a preferential trade agreement signed by the 
States of the ac in 1992, and continued in expanded 
form in 2001 with the atpdea; consequently, this 
agreement takes values of one (1) from 1993 onward. 
The variables corresponding to this agreement are 
atpdea and tatpdea.
— ua, unilateral arrangement applied during the 
liberalizing period of the Peruvian economy, running 
from 1991 to 2007. This variable also captures some 
of the liberalizing policies or structural reforms that 
were implemented in this period. The variables 
corresponding to this arrangement are ua and tua. 
— ma, Uruguay Round multilateral agreement applied 
since 1994. The variables corresponding to this 
agreement are ma and tma.
The additional control variables for the degree of 
synchronization equation, X1, are:
— Dif-Inflajt = the absolute value of the inflation 
difference between Peru and its partner country j 
in period t. This variable is meant to capture the 
effect of economic policy convergence between the 
two countries on the degree of gdp synchronization 
between them.
Binary variables are also introduced to capture 
the effects of countries being members of geographical 
regions. These include North America, Central America, 
the Southern Cone, the European Union, Asia, and other 
America. This group of variables is similar to the variable 
Ajt. The effect of the geographical area of the Andean 
region is captured by the variable ac.
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3. Control variables
The control variables for the rest of the Xi equations 
(i = 2, 3, 4), as the case may be, are:
— Yt = the real gdp (in 1990 dollars) of Peru. This 
variable is meant to capture the effect of domestic 
demand or growth on the dependent variables of 
equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4). This effect may be 
pro-trade (positive sign) or anti-trade (negative sign).9 
Equation (2.3) also includes the per capita gdp, Yp, of 
the partner country as a factor incentivizing foreign 
investment in Peru. The theoretically expected sign 
of this coefficient is positive.
— Dif-Ypjt = the absolute value of the difference in real 
per capita gdp between Peru and partner country 
j in period t. This variable is meant to capture 
the effect of differences in development level on 
the dependent variables of equation (2.2), Tjt and 
equation (2.3), Fjt.
A positive sign for the Dif-Ypjt coefficient in the 
equation for the degree of goods trade integration, 
Tjt, means that the source of the trade is comparative 
advantage and inter-industry trade predominates. A 
negative sign for the coefficient means that the source of 
the trade is competitive advantage and it is intra-industry 
trade that predominates. An alternative interpretation, 
which produces opposing signs, is the possibility that 
the divergence in development levels may increase the 
diversification of markets, thus reducing the degree of 
integration of each country j.
In the case of the equation for the degree of financial 
integration, Fjt, whose indicators measure the relative 
and absolute size of the stock of foreign investment 
from country j, the effect of the Dif-Ypjt variable is open 
to two possible interpretations. In the first, much as in 
the case of the degree of trade integration, the Dif-Ypjt 
variable indicates the source of international advantages 
(comparative or competitive). Thus, a positive sign for 
the coefficient of this variable implies that the size of 
the stock of foreign investment from country j in Peru is 
mainly determined by the exploitation of the resources 
from which Peru’s comparative advantages derive. A 
negative sign means that exploitation takes place in sectors 
with a competitive advantage. The second interpretation, 
as a source of attraction for foreign investment, is caused 
by the divergence in the countries’ development level.10 
9  The estimates of equation (2.3) also include per capita gdp, Yp, which 
represents the development level of Peru as a pull factor for foreign 
investment. The theoretical sign expected of this coefficient is positive.
10  This argument was made by Lucas (1990).
Thus, the greater the difference between Peru’s per capita 
gdp and the partner country’s, the less attractive the 
country will be to foreign investors, and vice versa. The 
evidence given in table 1 shows that the negative sign 
consistent with this latter interpretation predominates.
In the case of equation (2.4) for the degree of 
similarity in sectoral structure, the sign theoretically 
expected for the impact of Dif-Ypjt is positive. In other 
words, the smaller the difference in development level 
between Peru and the partner country, the smaller the 
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The SIMILARjt variable represents the degree of 
similarity (in terms of gdp) between Peru and partner 
country j. The sign of the coefficient for this variable in 
equations (2.2) and (2.3) is similar to that of the per capita 
gdp differential, insofar as it represents (comparative 
or competitive) international advantages. Intuitively, 
the sign of the coefficient in equation (2.4) would be 
expected to be positive. Similarity between economies 
that trade with each other also implies similarity in the 
degree of sectoral specialization.
RERbjt = the bilateral real exchange rate of Peru 
with country j in period t, where RERjt = [IEijt *CPIjt] /
CPIit; Eijt is the nominal bilateral exchange rate of Peru 
with country j, defined as the price of the currency of 
country j in terms of the currency of Peru; IEijt is the 
exchange-rate index with base year 2000, and IEijt = 
(Eijt /Eij 2000) *100; CPIit is the consumer price index 
of Peru in period t with base year 2000; and CPIjt is the 
same index for country j.
The coefficients of this variable represent the 
combination of relative supply and demand price effects 
on the degrees of trade and financial integration. A 
positive coefficient means that the supply price effect 
has prevailed over the demand effect, and both degrees 
of integration would increase with a rise in RERbjt if 
foreign investment went to export sectors. A negative 
sign for the coefficient means that the demand price effect 
is the one that predominates, and both degrees would 
decrease with increases in RERbjt if foreign investment 
went to export sectors.
ARANjt = the (percentage) simple or weighted 
average most-favoured-nation (mfn) tariff applied by 
importing country j to Peru’s export goods in period t. 
This variable represents the trade barriers put up by partner 
countries. Theory says that the sign of the coefficient 
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of this variable for the two degrees of integration will 
be negative provided that foreign investment flows go 
to export sectors.
DISTjt = the distance in kilometres between the 
capitals of Peru and partner country j. The theoretical 
sign is similar to that for tariffs.
Lastly, the following characteristics of partner 
countries j trading with or investing in Peru were also 
introduced as control variables for equations (2.2), (2.3) 
and (2.4):
— LANGj = dummy taking the value one (1) if partner 
country j has the same official language as Peru and 
zero (0) in all other cases. The theoretical sign for 
the coefficient of this variable is positive in each 
of the three equations.
— BORDj = dummy taking the value one (1) if partner 
country j shares a border with Peru and zero (0) in 
all other cases. The theoretical sign expected for 
the coefficient of this variable is also positive for 
all three equations.
— COLj = dummy taking the value one (1) if partner 
country j has had a colonial relationship with Peru 
and zero (0) in all other cases. The sign for the 
coefficient of this variable is the same as in the 
two previous cases.
— ISLj = dummy taking the value one (1) if partner 
country j is an island and zero (0) in all other 
cases.11 The theoretical sign for the coefficient of 
this variable is negative. 
11 The partner countries deemed to be islands are Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan and Singapore. 
— SEAj = dummy taking the value one (1) if partner 
country j is surrounded by land (practically 
landlocked) and zero (0) in all other cases. The 
theoretical sign expected for this variable as regards 
the degrees of trade and financial integration is 
negative.
— AREAj = the size of partner country j in square 
kilometres.
A number of information sources were drawn upon 
for the variables used. Real gdp (in 1990 dollars) and 
sectoral gdp were taken from unctad (2009). Data on 
the stock of foreign investment come from inei (2009). 
The data on the characteristics of the countries and 
bilateral exchange rates were taken from Tello (2009a). 
Export and import flows are from United Nations (2009).
4. initial hypotheses
Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical hypotheses specified 
in the system of equations.
In the case of the Peruvian economy, whose export 
structure is dominated by commodities12 and whose 
main trading partners are industrialized countries,13 the 
expectation is that, in the absence of country shocks, 
the theoretical relationships deriving from inter-industry 
trade and comparative advantages will predominate. 
Specifically, the indicators for degrees of specialization, 
12  In 2007, 84% of all exports by value were commodities and 62% 
were mining products (Tello, 2011).
13  Of the 31 main countries Peru trades with, 17 are high-income 
countries. The value of exports to these countries represented 60% 
of total exports by value in 2007.
FIGURE 1
Theoretical relationships between gdp cycle synchronization and specialization, 
trade and financial integration, and ptas 
Source: prepared by the author.
gdp: gross domestic product.
ptas: preferential trade agreements.
Degree of sectoral specialization (S)
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integration of goods trade and financial integration 
would be expected to negatively affect the degree of 
synchronization between the gdp cycles of Peru and 
those of its main trading partners. In other words, all 
the αi coefficients of equation (2.1) should be negative. 
Similarly, the degree of synchronization should negatively 
affect the degree of financial integration, i.e., δ1 should 
be negative and there should be an inverse relationship 
between the degree of specialization and the degree of 
trade integration, so that coefficients β1 and γ1 are less 
than zero (0). Meanwhile, given that foreign firms also 
predominate in Peru’s commodity export sectors (Távara 
and Tello, 2010), there should be a complementary 
relationship between the degree of trade integration and 
the degree of financial integration and, consequently, 
the signs of coefficients β2 and δ2 in equations (2.2) and 
(2.3), respectively, should be positive. By the same token, 
the indicator of financial integration should negatively 
affect the indicator of specialization, i.e., γ2 should be 
less than zero (0).
IV
Estimations and findings: the case of Peru, 
1982-200614
Unlike the studies of Imbs (2004) and García-Herrero and 
Ruiz (2008), which estimate the system of simultaneous 
equations without considering the differences between 
countries, the estimates reported in table 1 present the 
coefficients and efficient estimators derived from14 the set 
of regressions carried out with the efficient three-stage 
ordinary least squares method (ols-3),15 using panel data 
and incorporating the differences between countries16 
in accordance with the formulation of Baltagi (2005).17
14 The empirical analysis in this section is exploratory in character, 
owing to the limitations of the information used in the present study. 
Consequently, the econometric evidence reported in this section 
cannot be treated as definitive findings. Rather, it may be interpreted as 
offering technical hypotheses with a likelihood of being correct, since 
the evidence (with all the shortcomings of the information available) 
supports them. Once the data limitations have been dealt with, the 
hypotheses formulated in this section can be appropriately verified.
15 Vector autoregression models (vars) have not been considered 
owing to the limitations on the number of periods and for the sake of 
comparability with the estimates of García-Herrero and Ruiz (2008) 
and Imbs (2004).
16 (Unreported) estimates were also carried out with ols, two-stage ols 
for each of the equations in the system and three-stage ols for the whole 
system. In addition, two alternative measurements of the Hodrick-
Prescott cycles were used: the errors of the quadratic regression in 
time for gdp (Peru’s and its partner countries’) and their respective 
gdp variation rates. In most cases, the results of all these estimates 
and measurements were similar to those reported here.
17  This method was selected to ensure that the variance and covariance 
matrices of the equation error components were defined as positive. 
The four equations were converted into a system of matrices Y = Zβ+ε. 
According to Baltagi (2005), the estimator βe and the variance and 
covariance matrix V of this efficient ols-3 estimator are, respectively:
βe = (Z*’P Z*)-1.(Z*Py*) and V = (Z*’P Z*)-1, where P = X*(X*’X*)-1 
X*’, and X* = Ω-1/2.(I⊗X), Z* = Ω-1/2.Z; y* = Ω-1/2.y; E(εε’) = Ω, X is 
the matrix formed by the 40 predetermined model variables (including 
the constant and time).
The estimation was carried out in four steps: 
(i) estimation of ols errors for each of the four equations 
in the system; (ii) estimation of the variance and 
covariance matrices of the random effects deriving from 
the differences between countries and the errors of each 
equation,18 using the ols errors; (iii) determination of 
the Cholesky matrices of the inverses of the two previous 
matrices;19 and (iv) estimation of the coefficients of 
the system of equations using the ols-3 method with 
instrumental variables. These variables are transformations 
of the exogenous variables of the system, previously 
multiplied by the Cholesky matrix of the inverse of the 
matrix of variances and covariances of error vector ε of 
the system of equations.20
Eight regressions were carried out for each of the 
equations in the system derived by combining the six 
indicators representing the degrees of integration in trade, 
finance and specialization. The first column of table 1 
shows the coefficients of the regressions that had the 
highest and most relevant degree of fit for each of the 
equations in the system. These coefficients correspond 
to indicators ρ, T2, F2 and S1. The second column 
18 Where the error vector ε = (ε1t, ε2t, ε2t, ε2t) is defined as: εj = (I⊗e)
μj+nj ; μj is the random vector of the effects of the 31 countries (N) 
for each equation j; nj is the error vector of each equation; and e is a 
vector whose size matches the number of years.
19 The respective matrices are: E(μμ’) = ∑μ and E(nn’) = ∑n.
20 This Cholesky matrix (Ω-1/2) is a function of the two Cholesky 
matrices of the inverse matrices of the errors of the random country 
effects (∑ μ
-1/2) and the errors of each equation (∑ n
-1/2). Specifically: 
Ω-1/2 = ∑ 1-1/2 ⊗P + ∑ n-1/2 ⊗Q, ∑1 = Np∑μ+∑n, Np = 25 is the number of 
years, P = I⊗Jp, Q = I-P, Jp is a square matrix of order Np whose 
elements are equal to 1/Np.
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presents the percentage of positive and statistically 
significant coefficients from the eight estimations 
carried out for each equation. The third column shows 
the percentage of negative and statistically significant 
coefficients from the eight estimations carried out for 
each equation. These latter two columns show the 
degree of statistical robustness of the coefficients in 
the presence of variations in the indicators of financial, 
trade and specialization integration.
The last two rows of table 1 show the averages of the 
dependent variables and the coefficients of determination 
of the regressions in the first column.
Figure 2 shows the statistical results of the estimates 
of the coefficients that measure the relationships between 
the degrees of synchronization, trade and financial 
integration and the degree of sectoral specialization of 
the four-equation system described in table 1. These 
results support the following hypotheses:
FIGURE 2
Peru: empirical relationships between gdp cycle synchronization and specialization, 
trade and financial integration, and ptas
Source: prepared by the author.
gdp: gross domestic product.
ptas: preferential trade agreements.
Relationship is fairly robust and statistically signicant
Positive relationship
Negative relationship 
Relationship is less statistically robust or ndings are of ambiguous sign, or both
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(–)
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Estimated coefficients of the equations for synchronization, trade integration, 
financial integration and specialization. Efficient panel three-stage ols method, 
Peru, 1982-2006
Factor
(2.1) Degree of  
synchronization
(2.2) Degree of  
trade integration 
(2.3) Degree of  
financial integration































Constant 0.1723 50.0 12.5 -0.7989 37.5 37.5 120.2522 25.0 25.0 1.1847* 62.5 0.0
(T2)
2 T -0.0412 50.0 0.0       70.97*** 75.0 0.0 -11.9*** 12.5 50.0
(F2)
2 F -0.0005* 25.0 62.5 0.0026 62.5 0.0       0.1099*** 50.0 25.0
(S1)
2 S -0.0022 50.0 25.0 -0.0953*** 25.0 75.0            
ρ -218.6*** 12.5 87.5      
Continues overleaf
100
PERu: IntEgRAtIon, sECtoRAL sPECIALIzAtIon And synChRonIzAtIon WIth IntERnAtIonAL  
gRoss domEstIC PRoduCt CyCLEs  •  mARIo d. tELLo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 6  •  A P R I L  2 0 1 2
Table 1 (concluded)
Factor
(2.1) Degree of  
synchronization
(2.2) Degree of  
trade integration 
(2.3) Degree of  
financial integration






























2. Preferential trade agreements (ptas)
chi -0.2664 25.0 12.5 -0.8416 37.5 12.5 58.5489 25.0 0.0 -34.5* 0.0 12.5
dchi 0.0152 0.0 12.5 0.0411 0.0 12.5 2.2246 0.0 0.0 0.3258 0.0 0.0
tchi -0.1187 25.0 0.0 -0.9615 12.5 0.0 9.4115 0.0 0.0 -9.02 0.0 0.0
ac 0.1998 25.0 37.5 -0.1583 37.5 12.5 100.7731 25.0 0.0 -14.8 0.0 0.0
dac 0.1608 12.5 12.5 -1.4274*** 12.5 62.5 131.0232 25.0 0.0 -24.98 0.0 0.0
tac -0.0086 12.5 12.5 0.0978*** 62.5 12.5 -11.7654 0.0 25.0 1.98 0.0 25.0
acbr 0.1122 62.5 12.5 -1.9626* 12.5 50.0 -45.2430 0.0 0.0 -15.11 0.0 50.0
dacbr -0.0505 0.0 0.0 -0.1411 0.0 0.0 -19.5742 0.0 0.0 -2.24 0.0 0.0
tacbr 0.0045 0.0 12.5 0.0078 0.0 0.0 0.7367 0.0 0.0 0.22 0.0 0.0
acar -0.1790 25.0 12.5 0.7787 37.5 12.5 -48.1836 12.5 0.0 2.99 0.0 0.0
dacar -0.2381 12.5 12.5 0.0611 0.0 0.0 -17.2676 0.0 0.0 5.06 0.0 0.0
tacar 0.0142 12.5 12.5 -0.0127 12.5 0.0 1.4801 0.0 0.0 -0.4001 12.5 0.0
atpdea 0.0203 0.0 0.0 0.1829 12.5 0.0 -93.2900 0.0 0.0 17.7 0.0 0.0
tatpdea 0.0001 0.0 0.0 -0.0161 0.0 12.5 8.2432 0.0 0.0 -1.5 0.0 0.0
ua 0.0416 0.0 0.0 0.2443 0.0 0.0 -71.8163 0.0 0.0 2.84 0.0 0.0
tua -0.0047 12.5 12.5 -0.0232 0.0 0.0 6.6685 0.0 0.0 -0.41 0.0 0.0
ma -0.1460 12.5 12.5 0.7944 0.0 0.0 -86.6109 0.0 0.0 9.11 0.0 0.0
tma 0.0100 12.5 12.5 -0.0545 0.0 0.0 5.7680 0.0 0.0 -0.58 0.0 0.0
3. Control variables
y       -0.1E-11 37.5 12.5 -0.16E-10 0.0 50.0 -0.34E-12 0.0 50.0
yp             0.0354*** 75.0 0.0      
dif-yp       0.33E-6*** 37.5 62.5 -0.0329*** 0.0 75.0 -0.0001 0.0 0.0
dif-infla -0.0001*** 0.0 100.0                  
rerb       0.0539* 50.0 12.5 3.8021** 37.5 37.5      
tariff       0.0025 62.5 12.5 0.0451 25.0 50.0      
time -0.0014 12.5 12.5 0.1057*** 75.0 12.5 -4.8353* 0.0 37.5 -42.9715* 0.0 62.5
dist       -0.0005*** 37.5 50.0 -0.0185 50.0 25.0 -0.0020 0.0 50.0
lang       -1.8506** 0.0 87.5 -3.8455 25.0 25.0 -1.0539 0.0 37.5
border       1.5706* 37.5 25.0 -99.6162 0.0 25.0 33.801** 75.0 0.0
sea       1.8465*** 87.5 12.5 -185.50** 25.0 50.0 16.3041 0.0 0.0
similar       0.858E-10*** 37.5 62.5 0.248E-7*** 87.5 12.5 -0.27E-8*** 0.0 100.0
area       1.396*** 100.0 0.0 -177.33*** 0.0 100.0 58.492*** 62.5 0.0
col       0.1558 25.0 25.0 412.55*** 75.0 0.0 -45.717** 0.0 50.0
isl       0.8559 12.5 37.5 46.62 0.0 25.0 3.556 50.0 0.0
North America 0.1273 62.5 12.5                  
Central America 0.0915 37.5 37.5                  
Southern Cone 0.3526*** 62.5 37.5                  
Other America -0.0058 0.0 75.0                  
European Union (eu) -0.232** 25.0 75.0                  
Asia -0.201 37.5 37.5                  
Dependent averagea   0.064 0.001 0.687 3E-4 77.190 -36.834 -37.107
R2 0.635     0.944     0.676     0.885    
Source: prepared by the author.
Notes: All the regressions were based on 775 observations.
(i) With the exception of the first equation, where there is only one dependent, all the equations give the average of the two dependent options 
used: 2.2 (T1/T2); 2.3 (F1/F2) and 2.4 (S1/S2).
(ii) The estimated coefficients of each equation correspond to the regressions used in the indicators: ρ, T2, F2 and S1.
a Average of the dependent variable. The nomenclature of the trade agreements and the control variables are described in section III of this article.
* 10% significance level,
** 5% significance level,
*** 1% significance level.
gdp: gross domestic product.
acar: partial scope economic complementation agreement between the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, Andean 
Community member countries, and the Government of Argentina.
acbr: partial scope economic complementation agreement between the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, Andean 
Community member countries, and the Government of Brazil.
chi: Chile-Peru Economic Complementation Agreement.
atpdea: Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act.
ua: unilateral arrangement applying during periods of liberalization in the Peruvian economy.
ma: Uruguay Round multilateral agreement.
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H1: (degree of synchronization). When country effects 
are taken into account, the repercussions of trade 
integration and the degree of specialization as derived 
from the theory of comparative advantages based on 
natural resources are dominated by country shocks and 
have what are statistically quite robust21 effects on the 
degree of synchronization of gdp cycles between Peru and 
each of the 31 main trading partner countries.22 Thus, 
increases in trade integration, in the degree of similarity 
in sectoral structure, or both, lead to a greater degree 
of gdp cycle synchronization. Meanwhile, the effect of 
the degree of financial integration is more robust than 
the effects of the above, apparently exceeding the effect 
of inter-industry trade. Consequently, the higher the 
degree of financial integration, the lower the degree of 
cycle synchronization.
Specifically, the percentages of statistically significant 
positive coefficients for Ti and Si (i = 1, 2) were 50%, 
while in the case of negative coefficients for Fi the figure 
was 62.5%. One implication of this evidence is that the 
degree of synchronization of gdp cycles internationally 
has increased with the higher degree of trade integration, 
and it is therefore possible that the crises of 2008 and 
2010, the latter originating in the developed countries, 
may have affected Peru’s gdp cycles.
H2: (interrelationships between basic variables). 
The evidence reveals a variety of interrelationships, 
most of them statistically robust, between degrees of 
synchronization, trade and financial integration and 
the degree of sectoral specialization. On the one hand, 
the interrelationships between trade integration and 
the degree of specialization, those between the degree 
of trade and financial integration, and those between 
the degree of synchronization and financial integration 
are statistically robust 23 and two-directional. On the 
other, the effect of financial integration on the degree of 
specialization is less robust, with a positive relationship 
between the two indicators predominating.
The interrelationship between trade integration and 
financial integration is indicative of complementarity 
between the flow of goods and that of foreign investment. 
In other words, the relationship between the trade and 
21 I.e., when the percentage of statistically significant coefficients is 
50% or greater.
22  Note that the similarity between countries in their degree of sectoral 
specialization increases as Si approaches zero (0).
23  A statistically robust bicausal relationship has been considered for 
the variables (T,F,S) when the sum of the percentages of the (two) 
relevant coefficients that are statistically significant (of T, F or S) 
exceeds 100%.
financial integration indicators for Peru in the 1982-
2006 period was positive. At the same time, the greater 
difference in the degree of sectoral specialization resulted 
in a higher degree of trade integration, and this in turn 
increased the degree of sectoral specialization. It should 
be stressed again that the Sjt indicators are negative 
values, and when these decrease this implies a larger 
differential in Peru’s degree of specialization relative 
to its trading partner. The evidence is also robust as 
regards the effect of the cycle synchronization level on 
the degree of financial integration, although the effect of 
this on sectoral specialization is less robust. In this last 
case, however, financial integration has induced a greater 
similarity in the structures of production sectors. This 
finding is consistent with the higher degree of sectoral 
diversification of foreign investment in Peru.24
H3: (effect of preferential trade agreements). Virtually 
the majority of ptas have had no statistically robust effect 
on the degree of gdp cycle synchronization, trade and 
financial integration or sectoral specialization.
Only the Andean Community (ac) agreements and 
the economic complementation agreement between the 
ac and Brazil have had a statistically robust effect on 
the degree of trade integration and on the degrees of 
synchronization and sectoral specialization. With the latter 
agreement, it was country effects and not the agreement 
itself that affected these degrees. The dominant effect 
of the first agreement on the degree of integration was 
the permanent effect of the ac in creating more trade 
with its member countries.
H4: (effects of control variables on the degree of 
synchronization). The degree of synchronization of 
gdp cycles in Peru and its partner countries has been 
greater in the case of the countries of North America 
and the Southern Cone and lesser in the case of the 
countries of the European Union and the rest of the 
American continent.
In all these regions, the percentages of statistically 
significant coefficients were 62.5% or over. Furthermore, 
there is robust evidence that the degree of synchronization 
increases when the inflation differential between 
economies is reduced.
H5: (effects of the control variables on the degree of trade 
integration). The estimates reported in table 1 indicate 
24  In the 2001-2005 period, 31.7% of foreign investment flows went 
to the mining sector, 54.1% to the telecommunications sector and 
13.8% to the service sector (Távara and Tello, 2010).
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that differences in countries’ development levels or the 
degree of similarity (in gdp size) relative to countries 
that have traded with Peru, together with geographical 
characteristics (such as distance, geographical area and 
access to the sea) and cultural ones (such as language), 
have exercised a statistically significant and robust 
influence on the degree of trade integration between 
these countries.
The evidence shows that growing differences in 
development level or a growing degree of similarity in 
gdp size between countries increase market diversification 
and thus trade in goods and service between Peru and the 
trade partner. Again, trade restrictions (such as higher 
transport costs because partner countries are further 
from Peru or impose tariffs) have limited the degree of 
trade integration, whereas the geographical size, real 
exchange-rate and language variables have increased it. 
The effect of the other control variables on the degree 
of trade integration was not statistically robust.
H6: (effects of the control variables on the degree of 
financial integration). According to the predictions of the 
new endogenous growth theories, increasing differences 
in development levels between Peru and its trade 
partners have not promoted a greater degree of financial 
integration, and have consequently had a negative effect 
on the relative and absolute size of foreign investment 
flows from partner countries. Similarly, trading partner 
countries with a similar level of gdp to Peru or high 
levels of per capita gdp have had a positive effect on 
financial integration. With the exception of the distance, 
geographical area, colonial relationship and gdp size of 
Peru variables, the effect of the control variables on the 
degree of financial integration is not statistically robust.
Lucas (1990) provides theoretical and empirical 
arguments to support the thesis that foreign investment 
flows are greater between rich countries and smaller 
between rich and poor countries or between poor countries. 
The findings for Peru accord with these arguments, 
which assert that the availability of resources may not be 
enough for foreign producers to invest in poor countries. 
Endowments of human capital and technical know-how 
may also affect the profitability of countries’ sectors, 
even those that do not possess comparative advantages. 
Accordingly, the degree of statistical robustness has 
been greater for partner countries with a higher degree 
of development than Peru’s gdp size, which does not 
positively affect financial integration.
Meanwhile, there is reasonably robust evidence25 
that financial integration is greater with partner countries 
that are distant from Peru (the North America, Europe and 
Asia regions, for example)26 and countries with which a 
colonial relationship has existed, and lower when tariffs 
or the geographical size of partner countries are larger.
As regards the effects of control variables on the 
degree of sectoral specialization, the statistical results show 
a number of inconsistencies with competitive advantage 
theories and the expected signs of the coefficients. Thus, 
for example, the evidence is statistically robust as regards 
the positive effects of similarity in gdp size between the 
trading partner country and Peru on the difference in 
these countries’ degree of specialization. However, the 
size of the degree of similarity coefficient is very small. 
Similarly, there were positive effects on differences 
in sectoral structures, although statistical robustness 
was less for the colonial relationship and geographical 
distance of the partner country from Peru variables, and 
with Peruvian gdp. The magnitude of the coefficient of 
the variable is very small in this last case too. Again, 
the partner with border and partner’s geographical area 
variables had a negative and statistically robust effect 
on the difference in degrees of sectoral specialization. 
The findings for the other variables were less robust.
25  Percentage of statistically significant coefficients of 50% or over.
26  More than 50% of Peru’s exports by value go to the markets of the 
United States, the European Union, Japan and China.
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This exploratory study has presented a range of evidence 
and hypotheses concerning the interrelationships 
between the synchronization of Peru’s total gdp cycle 
with the gdp cycles of 31 countries with which Peru 
trades27 and the degree to which Peru is integrated in 
respect of trade, finance and sectoral specialization 
with these same countries. It has also estimated the 
repercussions of preferential trade agreements on these 
interrelationships. Subject to the limitations of the 
variables and measurements and the statistical fragility 
of the econometric method used, the evidence reported 
in this study reveals two main conclusions.
The first is that there is a statistically robust 
relationship between gdp cycle synchronization, financial 
and trade integration, and sectoral specialization. However, 
the two-way relationships that are most robust are those 
between the synchronization of gdp cycles and the 
degree of financial integration, between the latter and 
the degree of trade integration, and between this and 
the difference in the degree of sectoral specialization 
between Peru and its international trading partners. One 
implication of these interrelationships is that increases 
27  These countries account for over 80% of Peru’s total export and 
import flows.
in the relative size of Peru’s trade flows relative to 
the real gdp of the 31 trading partner countries could 
heighten the degree of real gdp cycle synchronization 
between these countries and Peru. Again, albeit with 
less statistical robustness, increases in the differential 
between the degree of sectoral specialization in Peru and 
in its partner countries could also increase the level of 
these countries’ gdp cycle synchronization. The second 
conclusion yielded by the evidence reported is that, in 
general, annualized ptas have not had any statistically 
noticeable effect on the synchronization of international 
cycles, trade and financial integration or the degree of 
sectoral specialization.
Both conclusions suggest that the high level of 
sectoral specialization in the Peruvian economy (its 
tradable sector in particular)28 and increasing trade 
integration have amplified the impact of the international 
cycles of the country’s leading trade partners on the 
Peruvian economy’s gdp cycles. In consequence, economic 
policies designed to diversity production sectors, export 
markets, or both, may help to offset the adverse effects 
of international crises in the short and long term.
28   Where some 90% of the value exported is accounted for by 
agricultural and mining resource-intensive commodities.
V
Conclusions and final considerations
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TABLE A1
indicators of the degrees of synchronization, trade and financial integration  
and sectoral specialization in Peru and its main trading partners, 1982-2007
Partner country ρ-HP T1 T2 F1 F2 S1 S2
1. Germany              
 1982 -0.14(-) 5.59(-) 0.13(-) 1.4( +) 1 090 000( +) -51.85(-) -48.87(-)
 2007 -0.33( +) 3.6(-) 0.1(-) 2.53( +) 5 499 231( +) -38.18(-) -35.81(-)
2. Argentina              
 1982 0.14( +) 10.62( +) 0.32( +) 15.95(-) 1 740 000(-) -42.1(-) -39.55(-)
 2007 0.54( +) 15.32( +) 0.6( +) -0.33( +) 1 223 846( +) -28.44(-) -22.72(-)
3. Australia              
 1982 -0.29( +) 1.35(-) 0.03( +) 0.24a( +) 106 667a( +) -35.83(-) -35.83(-)
 2007 0.38( +) 1.16( +) 0.04( +) 0.2(-)b 86 154(-)c -25.6(-) -21.02(-)
4. Austria              
 1982 0.03( +) 1.31( +) 0.04( +) 0.52( +) 50 000( +) -45.82(-) -41.45(-)
 2007 -0.24(-) 1.11(-) 0.04(-) 0.9( +) 203 077( +) -31.9(-) -30.37(-)
5. Belgium              
 1982 0.29(-) 9.61( +) 0.26( +) 1.38( +) 160 000( +) -48.97(-) -48.97(-)
 2007 -0.16(-) 8.25(-) 0.29(-) 11.09( +) 2 967 692(-) -35.59(-) -34.68(-)
6. Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
 1982 0.26(-) 17.88(-) 2.6( +) 49.32(-) 1 500 000(-) -23.25( +) -17.14( +)
 2007 0.21(-) 21.2( +) 4.44( +) 2.56( +) 101 539( +) -23.91(-) -16.08(-)
7. Brazil              
 1982 0.19( +) 6.98(-) 0.18( +) 5.45(-) 1 670 000(-) -47.95(-) -45.52(-)
 2007 0.73( +) 8.61( +) 0.28( +) 15.95( +) 12 901 923( +) -29.96(-) -28.55(-)
8. Canada              
 1982 -0.2(-) 2.66(-) 0.06( +) 11.36(-) 3 780 000(-) -35.72(-) -35.72(-)
 2007 0.1( +) 3.19( +) 0.1( +) 11.67( +) 9 243 846( +) -24.37(-) -22.36(-)
9. Chile              
 1982 0.24( +) 18.13( +) 0.89( +) 34.38(-) 1 690 000(-) -28.62(-) -25.17(-)
 2007 0.37( +) 34.06( +) 1.84( +) 187.08( +) 21 656 154( +) -22.88(-) -11.64(-)
10. China              
 1982 -0.68(-) 2.34(-) 0.06( +) 0.02d(-)e 50 00d(-)f -92.73(-) -92.73(-)
 2007 0.58( +) 4.68( +) 0.14( +) 10.2( +) 4 698 462( +) -78.85(-) -78.44(-)
11. Colombia              
 1982 0.2( +) 20.64( +) 0.86( +) 40.13( +) 2 560 000( +) -36.78(-) -34.75(-)
 2007 0.55( +) 32.67( +) 1.61( +) 185.81( +) 27 371 539( +) -25.76(-) -22.08(-)
12. Republic of Korea
 1982 -0.77(-) 2.47( +) 0.08( +) 0.12e (+) 576 92e (+) -43.39(-) -43.15(-)
 2007 0.12(-) 4.53( +) 0.15( +) 2.94( +)g 1 723 846( +)g -36.87(-) -34.14(-)
13. Ecuador              
 1982 0.55(-) 39.52(-) 3.21(-) 30.25(-) 1 150 000(-) -25.85(-) -23.33(-)
 2007 0.25(-) 44.38( +) 4.35( +) 28.16( +) 2 160 769( +) -26.08( +) -12.98(-)
14. Spain              
 1982 -0.11( +) 3.48(-) 0.09( +) 6.14( +) 1 320 000( +) -43.34(-) -37.85(-)
 2007 -0.3( +) 4.15( +) 0.13( +) 259.41( +) 143 273 462( +) -30.17(-) -27.48(-)
15. United States              
 1982 -0.62(-) 5.76(-) 0.14(-) 3.5( +) 11 380 000( +) -43.37(-) -43.37(-)
 2007 0.1( +) 4.31(-) 0.12(-) 10.4( +) 95 065 000( +) -34.2(-) -31.88(-)
16. Finland              
 1982 0.2(-) 2.12(-) 0.07( +) 0.05g(-)h 33 33g(-)h -40.51(-) -37.32(-)
 2007 0.08( +) 2.44( +) 0.09( +) 0.18( +) 47 692( +) -29.62(-) -26.04(-)
17. France              
 1982 0.07( +) 1.59(-) 0.04( +) 9.85( +) 5 890 000(-) -45.09(-) -45.09(-)
 2007 -0.43( +) 1.37(-) 0.04(-) 2.43( +) 328 462( +) -34.01(-) -32.57(-)
18. Italy              
 1982 0.21(-) 3.66(-) 0.09( +) 3.35( +) 1 460 000( +) -45.28(-) -43.65(-)
 2007 -0.18( +) 3.09(-) 0.09(-) 5.12( +) 7 206 154( +) -32.91(-) -31.64(-)
Continues overleaf
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Partner country ρ-HP T1 T2 F1 F2 S1 S2
19. Japan              
 1982 -0.23(-) 5.93(-) 0.14(-) 5.19(-) 5 750 000(-) -49.62(-) -45.07(-)
 2007 -0.16(-) 3.45(-) 0.09(-) 0.98( +) 3 425 385( +) -35.93(-) -33.42(-)
20. Luxembourg              
 1982 -0.3( +) 44.46( +) 5.31( +) 169.16(-) 4 970 000(-) -48.97(-) -48.97(-)
 2007 -0.34( +) 33.87(-) 4.47(-) 6.03(-) 691 923(-) -37.62(-) -35.08(-)
21. Mexico              
 1982 0.78(-) 3.93(-) 0.11( +) 0.4(-) 80 000(-) -36.02(-) -36.02(-)
 2007 -0.1( +) 5.36( +) 0.18( +) 19.88( +) 16 684 231( +) -26.07(-) -24.8(-)
22. New Zealand              
 1982 0.07(-) 8.58(-) 0.37( +) 0.24i( +)j 100 000i( +)j -32.98(-) -32.63(-)
 2007 0.3( +) 5.7(-) 0.29(-) 2.37( +) 263 462(-) -22.56(-) -20.54(-)
23. Panama              
 1982 0.58( +) 11.89(-) 2.02(-) 272.12( +) 80 000( +) -38.45(-) -38.45(-)
 2007 0.45( +) 12.88( +) 2.3( +) 553.73( +) 30 725 000( +) -31.83(-) -28.21(-)
 24. Netherlands              
 1982 -0.09(-) 8(-) 0.2( +) 5.23( +) 890 000( +) -40.28(-) -40.28(-)
 2007 -0.12(-) 6.16(-) 0.19(-) 112.24( +) 52 818 077( +) -28.37(-) -26.96(-)
25. Portugal              
 1982 0.27(-) 1.38( +) 0.05( +) -0.237(-) -100 007(-) -31.52(-) -28.63(-)
 2007 -0.34( +) 1.31(-) 0.06(-) 8.21(-) 1 427 692(-) -23.78(-) -18.86(-)
26. United Kingdom              
 1982 -0.63(-) 3.91(-) 0.09( +) 2.44( +) 1 240 000( +) -44.06(-) -44.06(-)
 2007 0.1(-) 2.61(-) 0.08(-) 75.78( +) 109 920 385( +) -31.85(-) -30.5(-)
27. Singapore              
 1982 0.53(-) 1.49( +) 0.12( +) 4.86k(+) 86 956 5l (+) -54.03(-) -54.03(-)
 2007 0.41( +) 1.77(-) 0.12(-) 21.63( +)l 4 750 000( +)l -40.72(-) -40.21(-)
28. Sweden              
 1982 -0.05(-) 4.04(-) 0.11( +) 7.92( +) 1 030 000( +) -43.48(-) -43.48(-)
 2007 0.11(-) 3.38(-) 0.12(-) 6.33(-) 1 250 769(-) -32.7(-) -31.33(-)
29. Switzerland              
 1982 0.08( +) 4.98(-) 0.14( +) 40.58(-) 5 140 000(-) -48.72(-) -48.72(-)
 2007 -0.15(-) 3.29(-) 0.11(-) 28.41( +) 8 023 077( +) -35.37(-) -34.85(-)
30. Uruguay              
 1982 0.49( +) 2.71( +) 0.25( +) 120.15(-) 4 080 000(-) -35.07(-) -29.72(-)
 2007 0.54( +) 3.67( +) 0.46( +) 109.27( +) 6 653 846( +) -24.75(-) -18.44(-)
31. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
 1982 0.1( +) 13.41(-) 0.43 (+) 17.24(-) 1 750 000(-) -52.66(-) -46.05(-)
 2007 0.37( +) 22.65( +) 1.03( +) 1.27(-) 93 846(-) -44.32(-) -40.57(-)
Source: prepared by the author. 
Notes: The indicators r-HP, T1, T2, F1, F2, S1 and S2 represent cycle synchronization and, with two indicators apiece, trade integration, 
financial integration, and specialization, as defined in section III. 
For indicators T1 and F1, the figures are expressed with E-04 and E-06 decimals, respectively.
a Figure for 2002. b Figure for 2003-2007. c Figure for 2003-2007. d Figure for 1983. e Figure for 1984-1990. f Figure for 1983-1990. 
g Figure for 1995-2007. h Figure for 1985-1990. i Figure for 1985. j Figure for 1986-1990. k Figure for 2004. l Figure for 2005-2007. The 
indicator for the degree of specialization, Si, is multiplied by 100; the range is from –200% to 0%. The signs in parentheses for the degrees 
of synchronization correspond to the sign of the growth rates of the correlation coefficients for 1982-1990 (for the 1982 row) and 1991-
2006 (for the 2007 row). Thus, a positive sign in 1982 means that the correlation coefficient increased in the 1982-1990 period. The S1 
information is for 1982-2006. The signs in parentheses for the rest of the indicators are the annual rates of change in each indicator in the 
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